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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-3514
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v.
DANIEL LUGO LUNA,
                                      Appellant.
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. No. 06-cr-316-09)
District Judge:  Honorable Gustave Diamond
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 20, 2009
Before:   FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 28, 2009)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Daniel Lugo Luna appeals his conviction and sentence for distribution of, and
conspiracy to distribute, cocaine.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
    He was tried with one other defendant.  The other eight, including his father, pleaded1
guilty.
2
I. Background
On September 13, 2006, a federal grand jury in the Western District of
Pennsylvania returned a 93-count drug-conspiracy indictment against ten defendants,
including Luna and his father, Juan Gutierrez, both of whom are Mexican nationals living
in the United States.  The conspiracy involved a supplier from Chicago, Reyes Bautista,
selling cocaine to two Pittsburgh-based dealers, Val Byrd and Gregory Sayles, who were
then to distribute the cocaine to other local dealers.  Count One charged Luna with
conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846, and Count Two charged him with distribution and possession with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). 
Luna was tried before a jury beginning on May 6, 2008.   During Luna’s trial, the1
government proffered evidence that Luna had introduced various members of the
conspiracy to one another, attended meetings at which details of the drug transactions
were discussed, housed Bautista at his residence when Bautista came to meet Byrd and
Sales, permitted three kilograms of cocaine to be stashed in his home, went with Bautista
to a nearby Wal-mart to purchase grease, tape, and other materials that Bautista used to
3mask the scent of cocaine on the money he had received for the cocaine, and received
$500 from Bautista. 
The parties presented differing accounts of whether Luna was present for
Bautista’s only successful transaction with Sayles or Byrd, which occurred on October 17,
2005.  Luna’s roommate, Melissa Schenker, testified for the defense that, sometime in
October 2005, she, Luna, Luna’s fiancée, and Luna’s father traveled from Pittsburgh to
McKeesport, Pennsylvania.  According to Schenker, Luna spent approximately 30 to 45
minutes together with her and with his fiancée dining at an “Eat’n Park” restaurant while
Luna’s father went to the hospital, purportedly to visit a sick friend. 
Bautista testified for the government that, on October 17, he, Luna, Luna’s father,
Luna’s fiancée, and Schenker drove to McKeesport and parked in a lot across from the
McKeesport Hospital.  The women, according to Bautista, walked to a nearby Eat’n Park. 
The three men met Sayles at a bar next door to the hospital and, while Bautista, Luna’s
father, and Sayles conducted negotiations, Luna sat on a bench outside of the hospital to
keep an eye on the vehicle, which contained the cocaine.  When Bautista, Luna’s father,
and Sayles returned, Luna began walking towards the Eat ‘n Park, and the other three men
drove to Sayles’s house to complete the transaction.  Agent Andrew Toth of the
Pennsylvania State Attorney General’s Office, who was conducting surveillance of the
transaction, provided an account similar to Bautista’s, except he testified that Luna
    The Court also submitted a special interrogatory concerning the amount of cocaine2
that Luna conspired to distribute, which it was to answer only if it found Luna guilty of
the drug conspiracy charge.  The jury found him responsible for conspiring to distribute
more than five kilograms of cocaine.   
4
remained seated on the hospital bench even after Bautista, Luna’s father, and Sayles left
the vicinity and made their way to Sayles’s home, where the transaction was completed.  
In the midst of deliberations, the jury asked to see Schenker’s testimony, Bautista’s
testimony about the Eat ‘n Park, and any other testimony regarding the Eat ‘n Park.  The
District Court agreed to provide the testimony but, over Luna’s objection, gave it to the
jury as the court reporter produced it, instead of all at once.  The jury first received
Schenker’s testimony and then Bautista’s, but, before Toth’s testimony was available, it
reached a verdict: Luna was found guilty on both counts.   2
The U.S. Probation Office calculated Luna’s offense level as 30, which, coupled
with a criminal history category of I, yielded a Guidelines sentencing range of 97 to 121
months, narrowed to 120 to 121 months because of the mandatory minimum under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).  At Luna’s sentencing hearing, the government recommended
the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which would allow the Court to sentence Luna
below the mandatory minimum, reduce his offense level to 28, and drop his sentencing
range to 78 to 97 months.  Luna argued for a variance based on his subservience to his
father, who was a central player in the drug conspiracy.  Luna’s argument centered on the
allegedly patriarchal nature of Mexican culture.  The Court dismissed that argument as
    The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We3
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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unworthy of serious consideration, accepted the government’s sentencing
recommendation, and sentenced Luna to 65 months’ imprisonment on each count, the
terms to run concurrently.  It entered a final judgment of conviction and sentence on
August 6, 2008, and Luna’s timely appeal followed.  
II. Discussion3
Luna argues that the evidence offered by the government was insufficient to
establish the charges against him or, alternatively, to prove that he was responsible for
more than three kilograms of cocaine.  He further argues that the Court erred by failing to
give the jury all of the transcripts that it requested, and that, in sentencing him, the Court
committed procedural error by refusing to consider the patriarchal nature of Mexican
culture.  All of those contentions lack merit.  
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
“In reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, ... we ‘must consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and affirm the judgment if
there is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.’”  United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 204 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
6The essential elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 are “(1) a
shared ‘unity of purpose,’ (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, and (3) an agreement
to work together toward that goal.”  United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir.
2006) (internal citation omitted).  Luna claims that the government failed to establish any
of those elements and, because the evidence is insufficient to prove that he had the intent
to achieve the “common goal” of cocaine distribution, the same evidence cannot be
sufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to distribute. 
The record tells a different story.  Confronted with uncontradicted evidence that
Luna facilitated and attended meetings where the details of the drug conspiracy were
discussed, accommodated the supplier and the supplier’s cocaine at his residence, helped
the supplier buy materials that would mask whatever cocaine residue lingered on the drug
money, and received payment from the supplier, a rational jury surely could determine
that, as we put it in United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2004), there is
“a logical and convincing connection” between the established facts and the inference
that Luna actively participated in the conspiracy and the distribution.  
The record also adequately supports the jury’s attribution of more than five
kilograms of cocaine to Luna, even though he only participated in a transaction involving
three kilograms.  Bautista provided uncontradicted testimony that the plan was to traffic
ten kilograms of cocaine from Chicago for distribution in Pittsburgh, but that the driver
“lost” seven kilograms en route.  (App. at 258.)  In addition, Sayles indicated that he was
    Luna is correct that we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s response to a4
jury request to review testimony.  See United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1400 (3d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Zarintash, 736 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1984).  
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supposed to purchase at least five kilograms from Bautista, an account corroborated by
transcripts of intercepted phone calls between the two men.  Luna cannot benefit from the
conspiracy’s failure to traffic the intended amount of cocaine, because the government
“need not prove that the amounts under negotiation were actually distributed.”  United
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 219 (3d Cir. 1999).  Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s
conclusion that Luna participated in the conspiracy to bring at least five kilograms of
cocaine into Pittsburgh for the purpose of distribution, regardless of how much cocaine
actually arrived.         
B. Transcript Request
According to Luna, the Court abused its discretion by not completely fulfilling the
jury’s request for testimony regarding the Eat’n Park.   As Luna notes, a trial court may4
decline a jury’s request for written transcripts of trial testimony only upon finding that
supplying the transcript will slow the trial or cause the jury to give undue weight to the
requested testimony.  United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1400 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Because the Court made neither finding, Luna argues, it was required to provide the jury
with all of the transcripts that it requested.  
Of course, as Luna must acknowledge, the Court did not decline the jury’s request. 
Rather, it agreed to supply the transcripts; it provided the relevant testimony of Schenker
    Because Agent Toth essentially confirmed Bautista’s account of what transpired in5
McKeesport on October 17, it is difficult to understand why Luna believes that he could
have benefitted from the jury’s review of Toth’s testimony.  Even if the Court’s method
of distributing transcripts constituted an abuse of discretion, it would not require reversal
because it would not have “prejudiced [Luna’s] trial in any meaningful way.”  United
States v. Tolliver, 330 F.3d 607, 617 (3d Cir. 2003).    
8
and Bautista; and it was about to send back the remaining relevant testimony – that of
Agent Toth – when the jury announced that it had a verdict.  Luna claims, however, that
the Court’s decision to give the transcripts to the jury piecemeal, instead of all at once,
constitutes a de facto refusal of the jury’s request.  Given the Court’s demonstrated effort
to provide the jury with what it asked for, we disagree.   5
At the root of Luna’s argument, it seems, is an implicit argument that the jury
should have considered all of the transcripts it requested before reaching its verdict.  But
that is not a proper basis for an appeal.  As the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts noted when presented with an argument similar to the one that Luna
makes here, once the jurors “retire for their deliberations, they are, functionally, in charge
of the pace and manner of future proceedings.  When [they] have requested that a portion
of the trial transcript be provided to them, nothing prevents them on further consideration
from agreeing upon and returning a verdict before receiving it.”  Tavares v. United States,
914 F.Supp. 732, 734 (D. Mass. 1996); see also United States v. Sanders, 893 F.2d 122,
138 (7th Cir. 1990) (trial court “did not commit error, let alone reversible error” by
responding to the jury’s request for recordings and transcripts of trial testimony by
9playing tapes first, even though the jury returned its verdict before it received the
transcripts).   
C. Sentencing Procedure
Luna’s final argument – that the Court committed procedural error at sentencing
by failing to consider the patriarchal nature of the Mexican family and its impact on his
role in the offense – is also unpersuasive.   While a district court in setting a sentence
must consider the relevant factors listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the
characteristics of the defendant, United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.
2006) (citation omitted), it need not reflect on sentencing arguments that are without
factual support or legal merit, see United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir.
2007).  
No legal authority suggests that cultural heritage is a proper ground for a
downward sentencing variance.  To the contrary, the Sentencing Guidelines advise that a
defendant’s race and national origin are never relevant for sentencing purposes, U.S.S.G.
§§ 5H1.10, and at least three Circuit Courts have concluded that considering a
defendant’s culture runs afoul of the Guidelines.  United States v. Dyck, 334 F.3d 736,
743 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204, 1212 n.4 (10th Cir.
1999); United States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 1998);  see also United States v.
Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2001) (“lean[ing] to the view that [U.S.S.G
§ 5H1.10] does forbid consideration of ethnicity or ‘cultural heritage’ in the sentencing
    In his reply brief, Luna accuses the government of violating Third Circuit LAR 28.1(c)6
by making prohibited ad hominem attacks in its brief for the United States.  Specifically,
Luna objects to the government’s attempt to denigrate Connie Acosta, the Federal Public
Defender’s investigator who reported on the influence that Luna’s cultural heritage had
on his role in the drug conspiracy, and to the government’s use of the defendant’s name –
ostensibly for humor value – in the following subsection heading: “Luna(cy): The Foiled
Attempt At A Shakedown.”  While those objections have no bearing on our analysis, we
agree with Luna that neither the government’s characterization of Ms. Acosta nor its
wordplay reflect the seriousness of purpose warranted by this case.    
10
decision”).  While the Guidelines were rendered advisory by United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), it is significant that no court since has questioned the wisdom of
§ 5H1.10 or the courts endorsing it.  We see no reason to be the first.  The District Court
did not commit procedural error by refusing to consider Luna’s cultural heritage
argument.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence.        6
 
